Justice Brennan\u27s Use of Scientific and Empirical Evidence in Constitutional and Administrative Law by Hashimoto, Dean M
Boston College Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 1
7-1-1991
Justice Brennan's Use of Scientific and Empirical
Evidence in Constitutional and Administrative Law
Dean M. Hashimoto
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Evidence
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dean M. Hashimoto, Justice Brennan's Use of Scientific and Empirical Evidence in Constitutional and
Administrative Law, 32 B.C.L. Rev. 739 (1991), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol32/iss4/
1
BOSTON COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXXI I
	
JULY 1991	 NUMBER 4
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S USE OF SCIENTIFIC
AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW-
DEAN M. HASHIMOTO*
The struggle for certainty, for confidence in one's interpretive
effort, is real and persistent. Although we may never achieve
certainty, we must continue to struggle, for it is only as each
generation brings to hear its experience and understanding, its
passion and reason that there is hope for progress in law.'
t Copyright C 1991 Dean M. Hashimoto.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College. A.B., Stanford University, 1976; M.S.,
University of California, Berkeley, 1979; M.D., University of California, San Francisco, 1980;
J.D., Yale University, 1984; M.O.H., Harvard University, 1988. 1 thank the participants a a
Boston College Law School Faculty Colloquium for their commentary on a presentation of
this article. I especially acknowledge the encouragement provided by Dan Coquillette, Fred
Yen, and Simeon Goldstein. I wish to express my appreciation for the research grant from
Boston College Law School which supported this work. 1 also thank Stacy Handler, Boston
College Law School Class of 1992, for her able research assistance. indeed, the faculty and
students at Boston College Law School have provided enthusiastic support in my first year
of law teaching that made work on this article possible during that time.
Drennan, Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 42 Rm.. A. B. CETY OF N.Y.
948, 962 (1987).
739
740	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 32:739
This essay is a tribute to the now-retired Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. 2 I was fortunate to have served as his law clerk in the
1986 October Term. Because of my interdisciplinary training, I
have a particular interest in Justice Brennan's views on the relation-
ship of law and science. In our conversations during my clerkship,
the Justice was quite interested in my medical and scientific' back-
ground.' He has a certain fascination with science and technology 4
and has noted both the tremendous impact that scientific advances
have had on modern society, and the importance for law to be
responsive to human needs that have changed because of these
advances. 5
This essay focuses on Justice Brennan's approaches to cases
which involve the substantive review of scientific and empirical ev-
idence as a means to ensure the accountability of government in-
stitutions. In particular, I comment on a difference in his ap-
proaches to evaluating factual issues in constitutional and
administrative law. Part I describes his recognition of the value of
scientific knowledge and his willingness to evaluate the substance of
scientific evidence in his opinions involving the Bill of Rights. In-
stead of being deferential to scientific and empirical fact-finding by
legislative bodies, he has relied on an independent review of sci-
entific information as a judicial check on governmental entities. In
contrast, Part II describes cases in which Justice Brennan has dis-
2
 This essay incorporates and builds on some of my preliminary thoughts that I ex-
pressed in an earlier tribute to Justice Brennan. See Hashimoto, A Tribute to justice William J.
Brennan, Jr.: His Use of Scientific Evidence in Constitutional Adjudication, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 701
(1991). In this earlier essay, I analyzed the case of McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987),
in the same way that I do in this essay. Subsequent to the acceptance of the final draft of
this earlier essay, an excellent article on the use of empirical evidence in constitutional law
was published. See Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding:" Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PENN. L. REV. 541 (1991). Professor Faigman
arrived at conclusions similar to my own in his analysis of the McCleskey case, but he concen-
trates primarily on critiquing the majority opinion. See id. at 595-600.
5 I had trained as a physician before attending law school and also continued specialty
training in occupational and environmental medicine just before and after my Supreme
Court clerkship. This medical training included the study of epidemiology, which is the
empirical science upon which modern medicine is based. On my first day as his law clerk,
Justice Brennan recalled that Justice Douglas had once hired a chemist—who had no legal
training—to work on intellectual property cases. He seemed quite pleased that he was
establishing an otherwise_ new precedent in clerk-hiring.
4 See, e.g., Brennan, Space Colonization and the Law, 3 HARV. J .L. & TECH. 7 (1990).
5 Brennan, "How Goes the Supreme Court?" 36 MERCER L. REV. 781, 786-87 (1985). As a
consequence, justice Brennan has also appreciated the importance of encouraging law teach-
ers to explore the interdisciplinary nature of law: "Law teaching is increasingly emphasizing
the knowledge and experience of the other disciplines ... ." Id. at 788.
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played some reservation in imposing legal requirements that would
require the Court to scrutinize carefully the scientific merits of
federal regulatory decisions that do not involve human rights under
the Constitution. Rather, he has generally shown considerable de-
ference to agency expertise.
Part III offers some explanations for the difference in his
approaches in evaluating scientific fact-finding by legislative bodies
and administrative agencies. I discuss several possible explanations
for this divergence, including considerations of institutional capa-
bilities, differences in the language of the Constitution as compared
to administrative law, and the possibility that he may just be result-
oriented. Each of these explanations has, however, its shortcomings
in justifying the different treatments of scientific information. Al-
ternatively, I offer a plausible explanation based on Justice Bren-
nan's view of the separation of powers doctrine. In his view, Article
III courts are empowered to define constitutional rights. Congress
may, however, create other rights and assign the factual determi-
nations involved in defining these congressionally-created rights to
administrative agencies. Thus, the Supreme Court should conduct
an independent evaluation of scientific information in constitutional
fact-finding, but should defer to administrative agency fact-finding
if a congressionally-created right is at issue. Justice Brennan's ap-
proach arguably permits both constitutional and administrative law-
making to consider current scientific information and thus ensures
the proper "progress in law." •
I. USE OF SCIENTIFIC AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a preex-
isting society but to make a new one, to put in place new
principles that the prior political community had not suf-
ficiently recognized!'
The document that the plurality construes today is unfa-
miliar to me. It is not the living charter that I have taken
to be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant, archaic,
hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and su-
perstition of a time long past. This Constitution does not
recognize that times change, does not see that sometimes
6 Brennan, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 7 (1985).
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a practice or rule outlives its foundations. I cannot accept
an interpretive method that does such violence to the
charter that I am bound by oath to uphold.?
When deciding matters of constitutional law involving human
rights, Justice Brennan was a self-admitted activist judge. He was
committed to the belief that judging must be "guided by the prin-
ciple that 'justice or righteousness is the source, the substance and
the ultimate end of the law,'" and he candidly distinguished himself
from the passivist judge "guided by the principle that 'courts do not
sit to administer justice, but to administer the law.' "8
The Justice believes that the evolution of constitutional doctrine
"only reflects the momentous changes we have witnessed in soci-
ety."9 One impetus to this movement is "the formation of new
thought structures due to scientific advances and social evolution."i°
Thus, constitutional law should not be static and bound by historical
precedent, but instead should "come alive as a living process re-
sponsible to changing human needs."" Justice Brennan believes
that law must reflect the knowledge and experience of other disci-
plines, including science.
It is not surprising, then, that in his opinions the Justice rec-
ognized the importance of scientific knowledge and showed a will-
ingness to use scientific information to justify holding the govern-
ment accountable to the Bill of Rights. Two cases in particular are
pertinent to this observation: McCleskey v. Kemp' 2 and Craig v.
Boren.' 3 In both cases, Justice Brennan conducted a substantive
review of scientific information as a judicial check on the actions of
government." In neither case did he assume that the Court should
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
$ Brennan, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 163, 165 (1987).
9 See Brennan, supra note 5, at 786.
10 Id.
1 Id. at 787.
2
 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
" 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
These two cases are only examples. There are several other cases in which Justice
Brennan has conducted a substantive review of scientific information and has used his
conclusions to hold governmental institutions accountable to the Bill of Rights. See, e.g.,
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 148 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that
due process should allow a putative father a right to a court hearing to prove his fatherhood
in light of blood tests that show a 98% probability that he is the child's father); Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (evaluating petitioners' statistical analysis and concluding
that it may provide acceptable evidence of Title VII violations); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 766 (1985) (noting the uncertainty in the medical testimony by various surgeons and
concluding that the proposed surgery would be an unreasonable search under the fourth
amendment in the face of this uncertainty).
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be deferential to the interpretation of facts offered by the govern-
ment.
In McCleskey v. Kemp, Justice Brennan wrote an eloquent dissent
that responded to the Court's dismissal of the petitioner's eighth
amendment claim." The petitioner challenged the Georgia capital
sentencing system, alleging that it operated in a racially discrimi-
natory manner in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments." In support of the claim, the petitioner relied on the Baldus
study, a large empirical study that showed a disparity in the impo-
sition of the death penalty based on the murder victim's race, and,
to a lesser degree, on the defendant's race. The study considered
230 nonracial factors that might legitimately influence a sentencer,
but concluded that the jury more likely than not would have spared
the petitioner's life had his victim been black.°
The Court in McCleskey dismissed the eighth amendment claim
because it was impossible to prove the influence of race on any
particular sentencing decision, based on the Baldus study. The
Court assumed the validity of the Baldus study and acknowledged
that the petitioner showed a risk that racial prejudice played a role
in his sentencing. It nonetheless concluded that the probability of
prejudice was insufficient to find a constitutional violation."
Justice Brennan focused his dissent on the eighth amendment
claim. He noted that under prior precedent, defendants challenging
their death sentences based on eighth amendment claims had not
been required to show that impermissible considerations were the
"but for" cause (or "cause in fact") of their sentencing decisions.
Instead, the defendants had been allowed to demonstrate that the
system under which they were sentenced posed a significant risk of
such an occurrence." Justice Brennan concluded that McCleskey's
claim differed in one important aspect from these earlier cases. His
claim was the "first to base a challenge not on speculation about
how a system might operate, but on empirical documentation of
how it does operate."2° Justice Brennan contended that the empir-
481 U.S. 279,320-45 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
i" Id. at 286.
Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
is Id. at 308.
19 Id. at 323-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24 Id. He further stated:
The challenge to the Georgia system is not speculative or theoretical; it is
empirical. As a result, the Court cannot rely on the statutory safeguards in
discounting McCleskey's evidence, for it is the very effectiveness of those safe-
guards that such evidence calls into question. While we may hope that a model
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ical conclusions of the Baldus study should have forced the Court
to confront the failure of the state's capital punishment procedures
to safeguard the rights of criminal defendants.
The Court's insistence on a requirement that the influence of
race must be shown to be the "but for" cause of a particular sen-
tencing decision means, however, that modern empirical studies that
quantify risk are irrelevant to this kind of constitutional decision-
making. Modern empirical science no longer relies on the assump-
tion of "but for" causation or "cause in fact," which was based on
the Newtonian view that an absolute causal connection could be
deduced from events. Instead, the modern concept of causality
("causal tendency" or "causal linkage") is based on the view of
contemporary physics and epidemiology that we can only determine
the chances (or risk) of a causal connection through inductive rea-
soning. 2 ' The kind of mathematical analysis used in the Baldus
study is best suited to identify institutional effects on aggregates of
people and to isolate impermissible factors that probably account
for these effects. 22
Justice Brennan further emphasized, however, that the signif-
icance of the Baldus study could be determined only if considered
in the proper social context. He stated that "[e]valuation of Mc-
Cleskey's evidence cannot rest solely on the numbers themselves.
We must also ask whether the conclusion suggested by those num-
bers is consonant with our understanding of history and human
experience." 23
 He then conducted a historical review of the dual
system of criminal punishment based on race in the past 150 years
in Georgia.24
 He concluded that this history was consistent with the
quantitative findings of the Baldus study. 25
 Justice Brennan's insis-
tence on considering the study's findings in light of known facts is
of procedural fairness will curb the influence of race on sentencing, "we cannot
simply assume that the model works as intended; we must critique its perfor-
mance in terms of its results."
Id. at 338 (quoting Hubbard, "Reasonable Lends of Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Patterns: A
Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. I 1 13, 1162 (1985)) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
2i
 The legal concept of causal tendency or causal linkage in tort law, which is consistent
with this modern scientific notion of cause, was developed by Dean Guido Calabresi. See
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Henry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 69, 71 (1975).
22
 McClesitey, 481 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2,t
	 at 328.
24
 Id. at 329-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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a technique routinely employed by epidemiologists to determine
causality. From a purely scientific view, the context of the empirical
study is important to understand in order to determine its true
significance. 26
Thus, Justice Brennan's careful consideration of the empirical
evidence sharply contrasted with the Court's view in McCleskey that
this evidence was irrelevant because it could show only a risk of
improper racial discrimination. This difference in approaches may
be attributable to a disagreement over the degree of deference that
the Court should give to state legislatures." The Court emphasized
that state legislatures were in a better position than the Court to
evaluate the statistical evidence.
In response, Justice Brennan argued that close scrutiny by the
judiciary was warranted especially when the constitutional rights of
a criminal defendant are at stake in a capital case. He acknowledged,
however, the gravity of judicial intervention, given that more than
two-thirds of states implement capital punishment laws. But because
"capital punishment is the most awesome act that a State can per-
form," he concluded that "Nile judiciary's role in the society counts
for little if the use of governmental power to extinguish life does
not elicit close scrutin y."28 Thus, Justice Brennan believed that the
Court had a constitutional duty to scrutinize the substance of the
empirical evidence to determine its social significance.
This willingness to review independently the substance of sci-
entific evidence, rather than defer to a legislature's analysis, is fur-
ther illustrated by Justice Brennan's opinion in Craig v. Boren. 29 In
that case, the Court held that an Oklahoma statute that prohibited
the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to
females under the age of eighteen constituted a gender-based dis-
26 C. HENNEKENS & J. III/RING, EPIDEMIOLOGY IN MEDICINE 40-41 (1987).
27 Justice Powell in his opinion for the Court concluded:
McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies. It is not the
responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to determine the appro.
priate punishment for particular crimes. It is the legislatures, the elected rep-
resentatives of the people, that are "constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people." Legislatures also are better qual-
ified to weigh and "evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their
own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to
the courts."
Id. at 319 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (citations omitted)).
28 Id. at 342 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 319) (citation omitted)—
" 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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crimination that denied males eighteen to twenty years of age the
equal protection of the laws." Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, accepted for purposes of discussion that the state legislature's
objective was traffic safety, and he examined the statistical evidence
offered by the state to decide if "the gender-based distinction closely
serves to achieve that objective."st
The State of Oklahoma justified the gender distinction based
on several studies, the most important of which. was an analysis of
arrests in one year that demonstrated that eighteen to twenty year-
old male arrests for drunken driving substantially exceeded female
arrests for that same age period." Justice Brennan first disputed
the social significance of the difference between genders. He ob-
served that the statistics showed that .18% of females and 2% of
males in the eighteen to twenty year-old age group were arrested
for drunken driving. Although acknowledging that this difference
was not statistically trivial, he asserted that it did not justify that
males and females be treated differently.
He observed that the Court had previously been confronted
with larger statistical differences between sexes and that the Court
had concluded that these differences did not justify imposing re-
quirements that discriminated based on gender. Furthermore, the
empirical studies did not measure "the use and dangerousness of
3.2% beer as opposed to alcohol generally, a detail that is of partic-
ular importance since, in light of its low alcohol level, Oklahoma
apparently considers the 3.2% beverage to be `nonintoxicating.'"
Finally, the statute prohibited only the selling of 3.2% beer to young
males and not their drinking the beverage. Thus, the gender-based
difference was not substantially related to the achievement of the
statutory objective of enhancing traffic safety. 34
Although he doubted the need to "belabor" the analysis of the
statistical studies, 35 Justice Brennan's rejection of the state's argu-
'° Id. at 210.
"i Id. at 199-200. Apparently, the Oklahoma legislature did not preserve its legislative
history materials that would have revealed its actual justification. Id. at 199-200 n.7. The
Court, however, accepted as "adequate the appellee's representation of legislative purpose,"
rather than reject the legislation because of the lack of documentation. Notably, Justice
Brennan did not rely on the fact that it was unclear whether the legislature actually considered
the statistical studies at issue. Rather, he assumed the legislature relied on the empirical
information in formulating the provisions that were being challenged.
" Id. at 200-01.
55
 Id. at 203.
11 Id. at 204.
55 Id.
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merit was almost entirely based on a substantive review of the sta-
tistical evidence. Indeed, his opinion in Boren directly implied that
a State must provide stronger empirical evidence to justify gender
discrimination." In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the state legislatures should be entitled to deference in
their evaluation of statistical studies. 57 Justice Brennan refused,
however, to concede that state legislatures were entitled to such
deference. Rather, he stated: "It is unrealistic to expect either mem-
bers of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors
of experimental or statistical technique."" Because the statistical
evidence failed to justify the state legislature's variance from "the
normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause,"
it appeared that he required a rather high standard of proof."
In sum, Justice Brennan has been willing to hold the govern-
ment accountable by insisting that the Court evaluate independently
the scientific information and its social significance and not defer
to legislatures when the issues involve the Bill of Rights. Such a
willingness to engage in scientific or empirical analysis may be useful
to a liberal, activist judge such as Justice Brennan in several ways.
If fairly done, scientific fact-finding imparts a sense of objectivity
to a position that may otherwise be criticized as a political or per-
sonal vision. Furthermore, in cases like McCleskey, such information
incorporates empirical observations about contemporary society and
hence allows constitutional interpretation to respond to changing
times. Moreover, from the standpoint of a liberal judge, rationalism
56 Perhaps, because of this implication, Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion that
stated explicitly his uneasiness with "some of the discussion concerning the appropriate
standard for equal protection analysis and the relevance of the statistical evidence." Id. at
210 (Powell, J., concurring). He also stressed the'importance of the statute that was "so easily
circumvented as to be virtually meaningless" to the determination that the "gender-based
classification does not bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Id.
at 211 (Powell, J., concurring).
37 Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The Court's criticism of the statistics relied on by the District Court conveys the
impression that a legislature in enacting a new law is to be subjected to the
judicial equivalent of a doctoral examination in statistics. Legislatures are not
held to any rules of evidence such as those which may govern courts or other
administrative bodies, and are entitled to draw factual conclusions on the basis
of the determination of probable cause which an arrest by a police officer
normally represents. In this situation, they could reasonably infer that the
incidence of drunk driving is a good deal higher than the incidence of arrest.
Id. at 224 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 204.
59 Id. justice Brennan further stated: "This merely illustrates that proving broad socio-
logical propositions by statistics is a dubious business." Id,
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may promote liberal and progressive values. For example, promot-
ing accuracy may be consistent with liberal values when determining
whether there are adequate procedural safeguards in welfare ter-
mination hearings.4° Finally, the reliance on scientific or empirical
evidence may have a legitimizing power because of the persuasive
authority that society extends to the scientific community.
Thus far, this article has discussed two cases in which Justice
Brennan has refused to defer to legislatures in the evaluation of
empirical information. He relied heavily on empirical evidence in
McCleskey to justify his position that the death penalty system should
be reformed, based on the risk of racial prejudice to criminal de-
fendants. In Boren, Justice Brennan held that empirical studies
submitted by a state were constitutionally insufficient to justify a
legislative reform to a state law that included a gender-based dis-
tinction. Justice Brennan's insistence on an independent evaluation
by the Court of empirical studies in constitutional law contrasts
sharply, however, with his general deference to agency fact-finding
in administrative law.
11. USE OF SCIENTIFIC AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Under our jurisprudence., it is presumed that ill-consid-
ered or unwise legislation will be corrected through the
democratic process; a court is not permitted to distort a
statute's meaning in order to make it conform with the
Justices' own views of sound social policy . . . . According
to the plurality, a standard is not "reasonably necessary or
appropriate" unless the Secretary is able to show that it is
"at least more likely than not," that the risk he seeks to
regulate is a 'significant one.' . The critical problem in
cases like the ones at bar is scientific uncertainty . . . .
[T]he magnitude of the risk cannot be quantified at this
time . . . Because today's holding has no basis in the Act,
and because the Court has no authority to impose its own
regulatory policies on the Nation, I dissent.'"
Given Justice Brennan's activism in interpreting the Bill of
Rights, his restraint in the area of administrative regulation may
" See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1975) (indicating that a public
interest exists in accuracy of pretermination hearings of welfare benefits).
41
 Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 688-91 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (hereafter referred to as the Benzene case). Justice Brennan joined Justice
Marshall's dissenting opinion.
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appear remarkable. Unlike Justice William Douglas who established
a reputation for his activism in construing both the Bill of Rights
and in administrative law,42 Justice Brennan typically sided with the
Court majority in deferring to the expertise of administrative agen-
cies on regulatory issues.° He refused to construe broadly statutory
language in an activist manner to create substantive or procedural
righ ts.44
For example, Justice Brennan displayed considerable deference
to agency fact-finding involving statistical and economic evidence
in his opinion for the Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
New England Electric System. 45 Section 11(b)(1)(A) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 prohibited a public utility holding
company from retaining an integrated electric system unless it could
not be operated separately without a loss of economies causing a
serious impairment to itself. The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit scrutinized the statistical evidence relied on by the agency
and concluded that the agency had erred in determining that a
particular gas utility had failed to prove a case for retention of its
integrated gas system.
Justice Brennan concluded that the lower court should have
affirmed the agency's order because its determination that divesti-
ture of the gas system would not entail a loss of economies likely to
cause serious impairment of the system involved the application of
expert judgment that had adequate support in the record." Justice
42 See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 829-45 (1968) (the Court
opinion expressing deference to the agency's expertise in rate regulation; Justice Douglas in
dissent).
45 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
" See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (upholding validity
of agency's zero-release assumption for storage of nuclear wastes); FPC v. Florida Power and
Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972) (expressing deference to agency's reliance on expert opinion
concerning nature of electricity). Even where Justice Brennan joined an opinion for the
Court that overturned an agency's decision, he emphasized the importance of ordinarily
recognizing deference to agency expertise. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983), the Court held that an agency's action in rescinding
a standard requiring passive restraints in cars was arbitrary and capricious. Justice Brennan
joined the Court opinion authored by Justice White. The Court emphasized, however, that
the ordinary, arbitrary and capricious standard should apply, but found the agency's action
unreasonable even under this standard after analyzing empirical studies. See id. at 51-54.
The Court further emphasized that the agency had exceeded its congressional mandate.
" 390 U.S. 207 (1968).
45 He noted:
The dissection and application of an economic projection is a function Congress
committed to the Commission, not the courts. A court may believe it would
have done the job differently and better; but judicial inquiry must be addressed
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Brennan thus emphasized that courts should not "indulge[] in an
unwarranted incursion into the administrative domain."47 Rather
than conducting the independent review of statistical evidence as
in McCleskey, Justice Brennan emphasized the importance of defer-
ring to agency expertise.
An example of Justice Brennan's refusal to join the Court in
imposing a requirement of scientific evidence is Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute ("the Benzene case"). 48 In
that case, the Court held that the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA) required the agency to demonstrate a signifi-
cant risk of health impairment before lowering its permissible ex-
posure limit in the workplace environment for benzene from ten
ppm to one ppm (parts per million). In the plurality opinion by
Justice Stevens, the Court conducted a detailed review of the sci-
entific evidence relied on by the agency to justify its regulation.49 It
concluded that the agency's rationale for lowering the permissible
exposure limit from ten ppm to one ppm was not based on a
scientific finding that leukemia was caused by exposure to ten ppm
of benzene, but would not be caused by exposure to one ppm.
Rather, the agency relied on a series of assumptions indicating that
some cases of leukemia might result from exposure to ten ppm and
that the number of cases might be reduced by lowering the expo-
sure.5° The Court held this scientific evidence as an inadequate
justification.
The plurality opinion required that the agency must show, on
the basis of substantial evidence, that it is more likely than not that
exposure to ten ppm of benzene constitutes a significant risk of
material health impairment. 5 ' Although the "significant risk" re-
quirement was not explicitly stated in the Act, the plurality con-
cluded that this requirement could be implied from section 3 (8)
that required the agency to promulgate standards that are "reason-
ably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employ-
ment and places of employment."52 This was quite a liberal construc-
to whether what the Commission did is fatal to its ultimate conclusion that the
holding company failed to carry its burden of showing a loss of "substantial
economies . "
Id. at 219.
47
 Id. at 211.
448 U.S. 607 (1980).
49 Id. at 631-38.
" Id. at 634.
" Id. at 652-58.
52 Id. at 642; see also id. at 639-46.
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tion of the statute because nowhere in the statute was a showing of
a "significant risk" explicitly required.
Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall's dissent that stressed
the limitation of the Court's authority "to impose its own regulatory
policies on the Nation." 53 Justice Marshall contended that the agency
carefully considered the problem and found that the number of
lives saved by the proposed regulation was appreciable, but that it
was presently impossible to calculate precisely the health benefits. 54
He concluded that the best available evidence favored the adoption
of the new regulation.
Justice Marshall also reviewed the scientific evidence in detail
and concluded that it showed that there was no safe level of benzene
and that the extent of risk would decline with the exposure level. 55
He concluded that this finding should satisfy the requirement that
an agency's determinations are supported by substantial evidence
on the record. 56
 He pointedly noted that: "The plurality's 'threshold
finding' requirement is nowhere to be found in the Act and is
antithetical to its basic purposes. 'The fundamental policy questions
appropriately resolved in Congress . . . are not subject to re-exam-
ination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of
agency action." Thus, in the Benzene case, Justice Brennan joined
the dissent in concluding that the Court should not engage in
activism by imposing a requirement of empirical evidence of human
risk to justify new regulations.
In sum, Justice Brennan's positions in administrative law cases
consistently support his refusal to imply a requirement of empirical
or scientific evidence to justify regulations. In _administrative law
cases, he has emphasized judicial restraint. These cases sharply
contrast with Justice Brennan's opinion in Boren, where he implied
that a state was required to present stronger statistical evidence to
justify a gender-based distinction. It appears that the most signifi-
cant and obvious difference between the Boren and Benzene analyses
33 Id. at 691 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34
 He noted that the wording of section 6(b)(5) required the agency to:
set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the
basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material im-
pairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular
exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working
life.
29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5) (1988).
" 448 U.S. at 700-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 723 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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was based on the constitutional/administrative law distinction."
Thus, Justice Brennan displayed a general willingness to be an
activist judge in constitutional law, while showing judicial restraint
in administrative law.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DIFFERING
APPROACHES
[When I] was admitted to the New Jersey Bar . . . the
preoccupation of the profession, bench and bar, was with
questions usually answered by application of state com-
mon law principles or state statutes. Any necessity to con-
sult federal law was at best episodic. But those were also
the grim days of the Depression, and its cure was dra-
matically to change the face of American law. The year
1933 witnessed the birth of a plethora of new federal laws
and new federal agencies developing and enforcing those
laws . . . .
In recent years, however, another variety of federal
law--that fundamental law protecting all of us from the
use of governmental powers in ways inconsistent with
American conceptions of human liberty—has dramatically
altered the grist of the state courts .... Supreme Court
decisions under the fourteenth amendment have signifi-
cantly affected virtually every other area, civil and crimi-
nal, of state action.58
The two major revolutions in American law that occurred dur-
ing Justice Brennan's lifetime were the development of federal
administrative law and the incorporation of the Bill of Rights as
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. During
his years in private practice and as a state court judge, the legal
community was debating the controversial relationship between the
New Deal agencies and the courts. Moreover, the Justice joined the
Supreme Court when it was initiating the incorporation of the Bill
of Rights. His differing approaches to analyzing scientific and em-
57 This distinction is also consistent with Justice Brennan's willingness to impose addi-
tional procedures on administrative agencies based on procedural due process requirements
in Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), while joining the Court in refusing to impose
additional procedural requirements not explicit in the Administrative Procedure Act in
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), through administrative
law interpretation.
58 Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 489-91 (1977).
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pirical evidence in these two areas of law are, therefore, of particular
interest.
There are several possible explanations for Justice Brennan's
willingness to conduct an independent inquiry of legislative findings
based on scientific or empirical evidence in constitutional law, but
his refusal to do so in the administrative cases. First, he perhaps
believes that the administrative agency has better institutional ca-
pabilities than the Court in analyzing scientific or empirical data.
Judges are usually not formally trained in statistical or scientific
disciplines. Furthermore, scientific information is not likely to be as
fully developed in an adversarial setting as in an administrative one.
If this explanation is credible, however, it is not clear why he should
believe that the Court is more able than state legislatures or Con-
gress to evaluate empirical or scientific information in constitutional
cases. It is not readily apparent that judges have greater scientific
or statistical skills than legislative staffs or that the adversarial setting
of Supreme Court cases is advantageous over research conducted
by congressional aides and consultants.
An alternative explanation is that the wording of the Consti-
tution is often broad, e.g., "equal protection" and "due process,"
whereas administrative statutes are detailed regulatory schemes,
including explicit limitations on judicial review. Thus, there may be
sufficient flexibility to interpret the Constitution to require a suffi-
cient scientific justification, whereas this latitude is lacking in ad-
ministrative law. Upon reflection, however, it seems that the lan-
guage in statutes, including the Administrative Procedure Act,
contains broad language, e.g., "arbitrary and capricious" and "sub-
stantial evidence on the record." Certainly, the splits among and
within federal circuits demonstrates the latitude of possible inter-
pretations of administrative statutes. The sharp differences in in-
terpretation among federal judges indicate that administrative stat-
utes are not so specific and precise as to deny an avowed activist
judge latitude in interpretation. 59 The Benzene case illustrates that
judicial activism can occur in administrative law through an inno-
vative reading of the statute. 6°
59
 Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in American Textile Mfg. Inst., Inc.
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-12 (1981) (holding that a cost-benefit analysis was not required
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act because the statute only explicitly contained
a feasibility requirement). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court.
50 See Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and
the Requirement of Adequate Reasons far Agency Decisions, 1987 buxr, Li. 387, 401.
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Another explanation for the constitutional and administrative
law distinction is that Justice Brennan is result-oriented. Although
he has strong convictions about individual rights under the Consti-
tution, he may feel less strongly about environmental or other con-
cerns that are regulated by administrative agencies. 6 ' In knowing
the Justice, however, 1 find this explanation the least likely. For
example, he has revealed his deep concern for the environment in
his Takings Clause jurisprudence. 62 Furthermore, his expressed
sympathy for individual rights seems more consistent with protect-
ing consumers, rather than being pro-business. Despite these sym-
pathies, he tended to side with the agency's decision rather than to
side consistently with consumers or businesses.°
1 believe that the strongest explanation for his divergent ap-
proaches in constitutional law and administrative law arises from
his philosophy concerning the separation of powers' doctrine. In
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,64 he
explained that "a critical difference [exists] between rights created
by federal statute and rights recognized by the Constitution." 65 This
difference is, according to Justice Brennan, based on two funda-
mental principles:
First, it is clear that when Congress creates a substantive
federal right,, it possesses substantial discretion to pre-
scribe the manner in which that right may be adjudi-
cated—including assignment to an adjunct of some func-
tions historically performed by judges . . . . [W]ith respect
to congressionally created rights, some factual determi-
nations may be made by a specialized factfinding tribunal
designed by Congress, without constitutional bar. Second,
the functions of the adjunct must be limited in such a way
that 'the essential attributes' of judicial power are retained
in the Art. III court . . . . 66
G' See supra note 43.
62 See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 842-64 (1987) ( Justice
Brennan dissenting from Court's decision to strike down a California Coastal Commission
requirement that building permits be conditioned upon property owner's granting a public
easement for beach access).
63 See supra notes 43 & 44.
" 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In Northern Pipeline, the Court held that Article III bars Congress
from establishing under its Article 1 powers legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over all
matters arising under the bankruptcy laws.
55
 Id. at 83.
" Id. at 80-81.
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Thus, Congress may assign to administrative agencies the function
of making factual determinations that are necessary to define
congressionally-created rights. This assignment presumably in-
cludes the power to make the determination of the adequacy of the
scientific or empirical support necessary to implement the congres-
sionally-created rights. 67
 Article III courts are limited to ensuring
that the agency is obedient to the intent of Congress. 68
 Congress
may not, however, deprive the Court of the determination of facts
upon evidence when a constitutional right may be involved. 69
 Thus,
the Court retains plenary authority, including the power to rely on
its own evaluation of scientific information, in constitutional fact-
finding.
Justice Brennan's willingness to engage in scientific fact-finding
may have been based not on practical wisdom, but simply because
he believed that the Constitution required it. This willingness, how-
ever, is also consistent with his belief that the Constitution is a living
document and that it should reflect the insights and knowledge of
contemporary society. The use of current scientific information may
be necessary to interpret the Constitution. In addition, this view
respects the fact-finding authority of administrative agencies to pro-
mulgate regulations based on their specialized knowledge as long
as no infringement of constitutional rights results. Justice Brennan's
approach permits both constitutional and administrative law-mak-
ing to respond to dynamic changes in science and technology and
thus arguably ensures the proper "progress of the law."
IV. CONCLUSION
Our institutional responses to social problems should be shaped
by current scientific knowledge. Increasingly, large-scale empirical
studies are conducted that provide invaluable information about
the competencies and failings of social institutions. As Justice Bren-
nan has suggested, however, it is vital to consider scientific knowl-
67
 "[W]hen Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion, in defining
that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies." Id.
65 It is my personal speculation that Justice Brennan's philosophy concerning adminis-
trative agencies may have been shaped by his administrative law professor, Felix Frankfurter.
See Brennan, supra note 58, at 489. Professor Frankfurter was a public advocate of many
New Deal programs, including administrative agencies. Justice Frankfurter held the view
that judicial review of administrative actions should be restrained in deference to adminis-
trative expertise. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
28 (1979).
69
 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 82.
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edge in its proper social context. While the scientific culture em-
phasizes "provability," the legal culture focuses on "persuasiveness."
We should determine the legal significance of scientific information
by assessing it in light of its social context. Justice Brennan believes
that the main responsibility for this assessment lies in Article III
courts on constitutional issues and in non-Article III forums on
administrative matters.
In Justice Brennan's view, scientific information has a vital role
in the interpretation of the Constitution. Studious evaluation of
scientific and empirical information may force us to reconsider the
fundamental fairness of social institutions. It may also require the
Court to articulate more clearly the importance of nonquantitative
moral values. Scientific and empirical fact-finding renews and rein-
vigorates constitutional lawmaking.
It is most fitting to end this tribute with his words:
It is time I close. My theme has been that the revolution
of rising expectations has vast implications for constitu-
tional law but that the role of the Court will remain that
of interpreting the Constitution to hold true to its great
design. If we see last Term's few decisions resolving con-
flicts between the individual and the government in favor
of the state as a departure, nevertheless we know that it
is a departure that must be short-lived, for in our society
the quest for the freedom, the dignity, and the rights of
man will never end. The quest, though always old, is never
old, like the poor old woman in Yeats' play. "Did you see
an old woman going down the path? [asked Bridget] I did
not, [replied Patrick, who had come into the house just
after the old woman left it] but I saw a young girl and she
had the walk of a queen." 7°
7° Brennan, supra note 5, at 793-94 (quoting W.B. Yeats, Cathleen Ni Haolihan, in THE
HOUR-GLASS AND OTHER PLAYS 49 (1916)).
